Resistance Against Iterated Attacks by Decorrelation Revisited by Bay, Asli et al.
Resistance Against Iterated Attacks by
Decorrelation Revisited
Aslı Bay?, Atefeh Mashatan??, and Serge Vaudenay
EPFL, Switzerland
{asli.bay, atefeh.mashatan, serge.vaudenay}@epfl.ch
Abstract. Iterated attacks are comprised of iterating adversaries who
can make d plaintext queries, in each iteration to compute a bit, and are
trying to distinguish between a random cipher C and the ideal random
cipher C∗ based on all bits. In EUROCRYPT ’99, Vaudenay showed that
a 2d-decorrelated cipher resists to iterated attacks of order d when iter-
ations make almost no common queries. Then, he first asked what the
necessary conditions are for a cipher to resist a non-adaptive iterated at-
tack of order d. Secondly, he speculated that repeating a plaintext query
in different iterations does not provide any advantage to a non-adaptive
distinguisher. We close here these two long-standing open problems.
We show that, in order to resist non-adaptive iterated attacks of order
d, decorrelation of order 2d− 1 is not sufficient. We do this by providing
a counterexample consisting of a cipher decorrelated to the order 2d− 1
and a successful non-adaptive iterated attack of order d against it.
Moreover, we prove that the aforementioned claim is wrong by showing
that a higher probability of having a common query between different
iterations can translate to a high advantage of the adversary in distin-
guishing C from C∗. We provide a counterintuitive example consisting of
a cipher decorrelated to the order 2d which can be broken by an iterated
attack of order 1 having a high probability of common queries.
1 Introduction
Unlike asymmetric cryptography, in which the security of a cryptosys-
tem is provably reduced to a mathematical problem and guaranteed by
an intractability assumption, the focus in symmetric cryptography is of-
ten statistical cryptanalysis and, in the absence of a successful attack,
a cryptosystem is believed to be secure. For instance, once the crypto
community has spent enough time for scrutinizing a block cipher and has
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found no successful attacks against its full round version, the block ci-
pher is believed to be secure. However, a different approach against block
cipher cryptanalysis was pioneered by Nyberg [Nyb91] where she formal-
izes the notion of strength against differential cryptanalysis. Her work
is followed by Chabaud and Vaudenay [CV94] formalizing the notion of
strength against linear cryptanalysis.
Decorrelation Theory, introduced by Vaudenay [Vau99b,Vau03], en-
capsulates the techniques that guarantee the provable resistance of block
ciphers against a wide range of statistical cryptanalysis, including the
seminal differential and linear attacks, as well as their variants, for exam-
ple the boomerang attack, truncated differential attacks, and impossible
differential attacks. The beauty of this theory is that it can even guaran-
tee resistance against some not-yet-discovered attacks that meet a certain
broad criteria in the model presented by Luby and Rackoff [LR85,LR86].
They prove the security of Feistel schemes by assuming that the round
function is random. However, their approach needs a very long secret key
and is not suitable in practice. Carter and Wegman [CW79,CW81], on
the other hand, use derandomization techniques for sampling pairwise
independent numbers, which has inspired the notion of decorrelation in
that it measures the pseudorandomness with smaller keys and examines
its effects against the adversaries.
It is worth mentioning that perfect decorrelation of order d is equiv-
alent to d-wise independence [Lub86]. Moreover, decorrelation of order d
is also referred to as almost d-wise independence [NN90,AGM02]. Fur-
thermore, the concept of decorrelation is somewhat related to the notion
of pseudorandom functions and pseudorandom permutations except that
we do not limit the time-complexity of the distinguisher, but only the
number of queries are restricted.
The adversaries considered here can query d plaintexts and receive
their corresponding ciphertexts, but are unlimited in terms of computa-
tional power. When these plaintext/ciphertext pairs are chosen randomly
and independently from each other, we are dealing with d-limited non-
adaptive adversaries, as opposed to d-limited adaptive adversaries. These
adversaries give rise to distinguishers of order d, whether adaptive or oth-
erwise, who are trying to distinguish between a random cipher C and the
ideal random cipher C∗.
Several block ciphers have been proposed whose security is proven by
decorrelation techniques, see for example DFC [PV98], NUT (n-Universal
Transformation) families of block ciphers [Vau03]. Using similar tech-
niques, Baigne`res and Finiasz propose two provably secure block ciphers
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to use in practice called the block cipher C [BF06a] and KFC [BF06b].
Decorrelation Theory has been used in other results as well, see for in-
stance [Vau98b,Vau00,Vau99a,Vau99b,Vau98a,BV05].
Vaudenay [Vau03] shows how differential and linear attacks fit in the
d-limited adversarial model by introducing iterated attacks, which are
simply constructed by iterating a d-limited distinguisher (see Fig. 1).
Linear and differential cryptanalysis can be formulated as non-adaptive
iterated attacks of order 1 and order 2, respectively, and the boomerang
attack is an adaptive (chosen plaintext and ciphertext) iterated attack of
order 4. Moreover, he computes a bound on the advantage of the d-limited
adversaries by decorrelation techniques in the Luby-Rackoff model. This
result is expressed in the following theorem. Let C denote a random ci-
pher, i.e., the encryption based on a key which is modeled by a random
variable, and C∗ be the ideal random cipher, i.e., a uniformly distributed
permutation. Moreover, [C]d is the d-wise distribution matrix of C (see
Definition 3) and ‖ · ‖∞ is a matrix-norm (see Definition 4).
Theorem 1. [Vau03] Let C be a cipher on a message space of cardi-
nality M such that ‖[C]2d − [C∗]2d‖∞ ≤ ε, for some given d ≤ M/2,
where C∗ is the ideal random cipher. Let us consider a non-adaptive it-
erated distinguisher of order d between C and C∗ with n iterations. We
assume that a set of d plaintexts is generated in each iteration in an
independent way and following the same distribution. Moreover, we de-
fine δ as the probability that two sets drawn with this distribution have
a nonempty intersection. Then, we bound the advantage of the adversary
as AdvANAI(d) ≤ 5 3
√(
2δ + 5d
2
2M +
3ε
2
)
n2 + nε.
In this paper, we focus on the above result and address an open prob-
lem and disprove a claim that arise from Theorem 1. This theorem shows
that, in order to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack of order d with sel-
dom common queries, it is sufficient for a cipher to have the decorrelation
of order 2d. However, whether or not this is a necessary condition has not
been addressed. Moreover, the bound given in the theorem can be inter-
preted to imply that, perhaps, a high probability δ of having a common
query increases the bound of the attack. Despite this hint, Vaudenay in
his EUROCRYPT ’99 paper [Vau99b] speculates that having the same
query to the oracle does not provide any advantage, but whether or not
this is true has been left open. We will settle both of these open questions.
Firstly, we show that the decorrelation of order 2d−1 is not sufficient.
We do this by proposing a counterexample consisting of a 3-round Feistel
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cipher which is decorrelated to the order 2d − 1 and, yet, we are able to
mount a successful non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against
it. Secondly, we propose another set of counterexamples where a higher
probability of having common queries surprisingly increases the advan-
tage of the distinguisher. In particular, we show that there is an iterated
distinguisher of order 1 on a 2d-decorrelated cipher when the probability
of having at least one query in common in any two iterations is high,
which is counterintuitive. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 summarizes some background. We dedicate Section 3 to our
main contribution and address the aforementioned open problems.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, F denotes a random function (or equivalently a function
set up with a random key) from M1 to M2 and F ∗ denotes the ideal
random function from M1 to M2, that is, a function drawn uniformly
at random among all |M2||M1| functions on the given sets. Similarly, C
denotes a random cipher (or equivalently, the encryption function set up
with a random key) over M1 and C∗ denotes the ideal random cipher
over M1, that is, a permutation drawn uniformly at random among all
|M1|! permutations. We use the following standard notations: |S| denotes
the cardinality of the set S;Md is the set of all sequences of d tuples over
the set M; GF(q) is the finite field with q elements; GF(q)[x] is the set of
polynomials defined over GF(q); E(X) denotes the expected value of the
random variable X; V (X) is the variance of the random variable X; and
gcd(p(x), q(x)) denotes the greatest common divisor of p(x) and q(x).
We consider the Luby-Rackoff model [LR85] in which an adversary
A is unbounded in terms of computational power. It is bounded to d
number of plaintext/ciphertext queries to an oracle Ω implementing a
random function. The goal of the adversary A is to guess whether this
function is drawn following the distribution of F (resp. C) or of F ∗ (resp.
C∗). When queries are chosen randomly and at once, such an adversary is
exactly a d-limited non-adaptive distinguisher. However, when queries are
chosen depending on the answers to the previous queries, it is referred to
as a d-limited adaptive distinguisher. In both distinguishers, the measure
of success of A is computed by means of the advantage of the adversary.
Definition 2. Let F0 and F1 be two random functions. The advantage of
an adversary A distinguishing F0 from F1 is defined by AdvA(F0, F1) =∣∣Pr[A(F0) = 1]− Pr[A(F1) = 1]∣∣.
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Another measure is the best advantage of the distinguisher which is
formulated as BestAdvζ(F0, F1) = maxA∈ζ AdvA. Here, the maximum is
taken over adversaries in a class ζ. For instance, ζ can consist of all non-
adaptive or all adaptive d-limited distinguishers, denoted by NA(d) and
A(d), respectively, between F0 and F1 depending on A being non-adaptive
or adaptive.
Vaudenay also relates d-limited distinguishers with the two milestones
of block cipher cryptanalysis, namely differential and linear cryptanaly-
ses. These attacks are in fact members of a set of attacks called iterated
attacks which includes many statistical attacks against block ciphers. Iter-
ated attacks are basically constructed by iterating non-adaptive d-limited
distinguishers and they are called non-adaptive iterated distinguishers of
order d. We denote this distinguisher and its advantage by ANAI(d) and
AdvANAI(d) , respectively. Briefly, a function T produces the binary out-
come Ti of the d-limited distinguisher at iteration i. Another function
Acc produces the final outcome based on (T1, . . . , Tn). The advantage of
this Linear and differential cryptanalyses can be given as examples for
non-adaptive iterated attacks of order 1 and 2, respectively. Boomerang
attack is an adaptive iterated attack of order 4 (with chosen plaintexts
and ciphertexts). Figure 1 gives a generic non-adaptive iterated distin-
guisher of order d with chosen plaintexts. We note that when referring
to the advantage of an adversary in the rest of the paper, what we really
mean is the best advantage.
Parameters: a complexity n, a distribution on X, a test T , a set Acc
Oracle: an oracle Ω implementing a permutation c
for i = 1 to n do
pick x = (x1, . . . , xd) at random
get y = (c(x1), . . . , c(xd))
set Ti = 0 or 1 such that Ti = T (x, y)
end for
if (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Acc then
output 1
else
output 0
end if
Fig. 1. A generic non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d
The d-wise distribution matrix of a random function is defined next.
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Definition 3. [Vau03] Let F be a random function fromM1 toM2. The
d-wise distribution matrix [F ]d of F is a |M1|d × |M2|d-matrix which is
defined by [F ]d(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd) = PrF [F (x1) = y1, . . . , F (xd) = yd], where
x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈Md1 and y = (y1, . . . , yd) ∈Md2.
Afterwards, the decorrelation of order d of a random function F is
computed by finding the distance D([F ]d, [F ∗]d) between its d-wise dis-
tribution matrix and the d-wise distribution matrix of the ideal random
function F ∗. The definition of D indeed depends on whether the used dis-
tinguisher is adaptive or not. Moreover, if D([F ]d, [F ∗]d) = 0, then F is a
perfect d-decorrelated function. During the paper, we use a d-decorrelated
function and a function decorrelated to the order d, interchangeably.
Definition 4. Let M ∈ R|M1|d×|M2|d be a matrix. Then, two matrix-
norms are defined by ‖M‖∞ = maxx1,...,xd
∑
y1,...,yd
|M(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd)|
and ‖M‖A = maxx1
∑
y1
· · ·maxxd
∑
yd
|M(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd)|.
Next, the advantage of the best distinguisher is computed.
Theorem 5 (Theorems 10 and 11 in [Vau03]). Let F and F ∗ be
a random function and the ideal random function, respectively. The re-
spective advantages of the best d-limited non-adaptive and adaptive dis-
tinguishers, ANA(d) and AA(d), are AdvANA(d)(F, F ∗) = 12‖[F ]d − [F ∗]d‖∞
and AdvAA(d)(F, F
∗) = 12‖[F ]d − [F ∗]d‖A.
Theorem 1 provides a bound for the advantage of a distinguisher
against random permutations. We provide the following theorem for the
case of random functions with a better bound for the advantage.
Theorem 6. Let F be a random function from M1 to M2, where d ≤
|M1|/2 and |M2| = N . Assume that F is decorrelated to the order 2d
by ‖[F ]2d − [F ∗]2d‖∞ ≤ ε, where F ∗ is the ideal random function. We
consider a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d between F and
F ∗ with n iterations. We assume that a set of d plaintexts is generated in
each iteration in an independent way and following the same distribution.
Moreover, we define δ as the probability that two sets drawn with this
distribution have a nonempty intersection. Then, we bound the advantage
of the adversary as
AdvANAI(d) ≤ 5 3
√(
2δ +
3ε
2
)
n2 + nε.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
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Theorem 7 (Theorem 21 in [Vau03] for k = r = 3). Let F1, F2, and
F3 be three independent random functions over M1 such that ‖[Fi]d −
[F ∗]d‖A ≤ ε for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where F ∗ is the ideal random function.
Consider a 3-round Feistel cipher C on M21 as in Fig. 2 having Fi’s
as a round function in round i and the ideal cipher C∗. Then, we have
‖[C]d − [C∗]d‖A ≤ 3ε+ 2d2/
√
M, where M = |M1|2.
The following results are useful for the rest of the paper.
Definition 8. The trace Tr(β) of an element β ∈ GF(2k), is defined as
Tr(β) = β + β2 + · · ·+ β2k−1 .
Note that it is well known that the trace is linear and the trace of an
element of GF(2k) is either 0 or 1.
Lemma 9. Hoeffding’s bound [Hoe62]: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be inde-
pendent random variables and 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Define
X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=0Xi and let µ = E(X¯). Then, for ε, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 − µ, we have
Pr[X¯ ≥ E(X¯) + ε] ≤ e−2nε2and Pr[X¯ ≤ E(X¯)− ε] ≤ e−2nε2 . In addition,
two-sided Hoeffding’s bound is stated by Pr[|X¯ − E(X¯)| ≥ ε] ≤ 2e−2nε2 .
3 Addressing the Two Open Problems
We deal with two open problems in Decorrelation Theory. In [Vau03],
Vaudenay proposes Theorem 1 proving that the decorrelation of order 2d
is sufficient for a cipher in order to resist a non-adaptive iterated attack
of order d. We show here that the decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is not
sufficient by providing a counterexample. Secondly, the same theorem
can be interpreted to imply that probability of having common queries
increases the bound of the attack. To see the effect of this probability,
we provide another counterexample showing that when this probability
is high, the advantage of the distinguisher can be high.
We now provide a three round Feistel scheme C to be used in the
following two subsections. This cipher C consists of three perfect κ-
decorrelated functions F1, F2, and F3 onM1 = GF(q). Each Fi is defined
by Fi(x) = a
i
κ−1xκ−1 +aiκ−2xκ−2 + · · ·+ai0 over a finite field GF(q), where
(aiκ−1, aiκ−2, . . . , ai0) is distributed uniformly at random over GF(q)κ, for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. According to Theorem 7, we have ‖[C]κ − [C∗]κ‖A ≤ 2κ2/q.
3.1 Decorrelation of Order 2d− 1 is NOT Sufficient
In this section, we are going to propose a counterexample on a 3-round
Feistel cipher decorrelated to the order 2d − 1. We are going to provide
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Fig. 2. The structure of the distinguisher for the 3-round Feistel cipher used in sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2
a successful non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against this
cipher showing that the decorrelation of order 2d − 1 is not enough to
resist a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d.
In our counterexample, we distinguish C for κ = 2d−1. We show that
C is not resistant to our non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d
while ‖[C]2d−1 − [C∗]2d−1‖A ≤ 2(2d− 1)2/q. First of all, we start with
explaining the input distribution that adversary uses. Let (x1, x2, . . . , xd)
be the input tuple and (y1, y2, . . . , yd) be the output tuple such that
C(xi) = yi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We will pick plaintexts with specific prop-
erties. Every plaintext xi can be written as xi = x
L
i ‖xRi , where xLi and
xRi , both in GF(q), are left and right halves of xi. For each i, we let
xRi = 0, i.e., xi = x
L
i ‖0. Moreover, we choose a random c1 and plaintexts
(xL1 , x
L
2 , . . . , x
L
d ) satisfying
∏d
i=1 x
L
i = c0 and∑
i1≤d
xLi1 = cd−1,
∑
i1<i2≤d
xLi1x
L
i2 = cd−2, . . . ,
∑
i1<···<id−1≤d
xLi1x
L
i2 · · ·xLid−1 = c1,
where all ci’s, except c1, are previously chosen constants and x
L
i ’s are
pairwise distinct. The left half is chosen by the algorithm is Fig. 3.
Given d and c0, c2, . . . , cd−1 ∈ GF(q), this algorithm first constructs
h(x), where h(x) = xd− cd−1xd−1 + · · ·+ (−1)d−2c2x2 + (−1)dc0. It picks
a random c1 from GF(q) to construct g(x) which is defined as g(x) =
h(x)+(−1)d−1c1x. It checks if g(x) divides xq−x in order to be sure that
all roots are in GF(q). Afterwards, it verifies that all roots are distinct. For
this reason, it verifies that g(x) and its derivative g′(x) have no common
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divisors. Once these two conditions are satisfied, the algorithm outputs
the roots of the polynomial g and gets the desired plaintext tuple.
The number of iterations in the algorithm to get the desired plaintext
tuple is approximately qd/
(
q
d
) ≤ d!, that is, one over the probability that
a random monic polynomial of degree d has d distinct roots in GF(q). To
be more precise, since there are q possible irreducible factors of degree
1 in GF(q)[x], we compute their d possible combinations in
(
q
d
)
ways to
construct polynomials of degree d and we divide it by the number of total
monic polynomials of degree d which is qd.
Input: d,c0, c2, . . . , cd−1, q
Output: (x1, . . . , xd)
construct h(x) = xd − cd−1xd−1 + · · ·+ (−1)d−2c2x2 + (−1)dc0
repeat
pick c1 ∈ GF(q) at random and construct g(x) = h(x) + (−1)d−1c1x
until xq ≡ x mod g(x) and gcd(g(x), g′(x)) = 1
find the roots (x1, . . . , xd) of g(x) by using a factorization algorithm for polynomials
return (x1, . . . , xd)
Fig. 3. The algorithm to generate the left half of the plaintext tuples
Consider the encryption of each round when xi’s are satisfying the
above properties. After the first round, we have 0‖(xLi +F1(0)). Then, the
output of the second round encryption is (xLi + F1(0))‖F2(xLi + F1(0)).
Finally, the corresponding ciphertext yi will be yi = y
L
i ‖yRi = (F3(F2(xLi +
F1(0)))+x
L
i +F1(0))‖F2(xLi +F1(0)). However, we will only be interested
in the right part of the ciphertext, i.e., yRi , which can be seen as the output
of a random polynomial function of degree at most 2d−2. More explicitly,
since yRi = F2(x
L
i +F1(0)), we can write y
R
i as a function of x
L
i such that
F (xLi ) = F2(x
L
i + a
1
0). Obviously, each coefficient of the polynomial F is
a function of coefficients of F2 and the constant coefficient of F1, namely
fi(a
1
0, a
2
2d−2, . . . , a
2
0). Since the coefficients of F depend on the coefficients
of random functions F1 and F2, F is also a random function.
Since we use the input distribution defined above, we can get some
fixed bits by interpolating the right part of the output of the cipher, which
is exactly the function F mentioned previously. In more detail, in every
iteration we interpolate a polynomial r, which will appear in Equation 1.
We expect that for the ideal random function F ∗ the constant coefficient
of the polynomial r would be random, but for F it would be fixed. We
prove this in Lemma 10. After formally writing this argument, by defining
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the test function T and the acceptance set Acc, we can distinguish the
cipher from the ideal random cipher with only two iterations.
The distinguisher has d plaintext-ciphertext pairs in each iteration
and F is a polynomial. Moreover, we know d points on F and we can use
the underdetermined interpolation technique to determine F . We write
F such that F (x) = a2d−2x2d−2 + a2d−3x2d−3 + · · ·+ a0 over GF(q), then
we can determine F by
F (x) = r(x) + s(x)g(x). (1)
Here, r is a unique polynomial of degree at most d− 1 which interpolates
d given points, s is a polynomial of degree at most d − 2 over GF(q)
and g is a polynomial of degree d with the xLi ’s as its roots g(x) =
(x−xL1 ) · · · (x−xLd ). Let r(x) = rd−1xd−1+· · ·+r0, g(x) = xd−cd−1xd−1+
· · ·+(−1)d−1c1+(−1)dc0, and s(x) = sd−2xd−2+· · ·+s0, where ri, cj , sk ∈
GF(q), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ d − 1, and 0 ≤ k ≤ d − 2. We note that g(x) can be
written as g(x) = h(x) + (−1)d−1c1x, where h is a fixed polynomial of
degree d with zero coefficient for the term x.
Our aim is to get some fixed bits related to the function F in each
iteration to have a distinguisher. The following lemma shows that, when
the input distribution is picked as above, the constant coefficient r0 of
polynomial r is fixed in each iteration.
Lemma 10. Let F be the polynomial of degree at most 2d−2 over GF(q)
as defined above. Let xL1 , . . . , x
L
d ∈ GF(q) be the left half of the plaintexts
following the distribution above and F (xLi ) = y
R
i , 0 ≤ i ≤ d. Then,
the constant coefficient r0 of the polynomial r, which is obtained by the
Lagrange interpolation of the given d points, is fixed in each iteration.
Proof. We write g(x) = h(x) + (−1)d−1c1x for (xL1 , . . . , xLd ) and for some
c1 ∈ GF(q), where h is a fixed polynomial. Therefore, F (x) = r(x) +
s(x)g(x) = r(x) + s(x)(h(x) + (−1)d−1c1x) as in Equation 1. Moreover,
F (x) = r′(x) + s′(x)g′(x) = r′(x) + s′(x)(h(x) + (−1)d−1c′1x), for some
c′1 ∈ GF(q). Hence,
(r(x) + s(x)(h(x) + (−1)d−1c1x))− (r′(x) + s′(x)(h(x) + (−1)d−1c′1x))
= r(x)− r′(x) + ((−1)d−1(c1s(x)− c′1s′(x)))x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Polynomial 1
+ (s(x)− s′(x))h(x) = 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Polynomial 2
⇒ s(x) = s′(x).
Polynomial 1 has degree at most d− 1 and Polynomial 2 has at least
degree d (the degree of h), unless s(x) = s′(x). Therefore, in order to
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have zero on the left side of the equation, s(x) − s′(x) has to be zero.
This shows that the polynomial s is a fixed polynomial, i.e., independent
from the plaintext tuple that is queried. Therefore, we can write F as
F (x) = r(x)+s(x)(h(x)+(−1)d−1c1x), for fixed polynomials s and h and
for some c1 ∈ GF(q). Hence, when x = 0, we have F (0) = r(0) + s(0)h(0)
which implies that r0 = a0 − s0h0 is always fixed. uunionsq
We can now deduce that r0 is always fixed and independent from the
plaintext tuple due to the choice of plaintext tuple.
Now, we use Lemma 10 to construct a distinguisher between C and C∗.
We denote the derived value of r0 as a function f((x1, . . . , xd), (y1, . . . , yd)).
Let D be a subset of distinguished values of GF(q) with a given cardinal-
ity q/µ, where µ > 1 is a positive divisor of q. Define the test function as
T ((x1, . . . , xd), (y1, . . . , yd)) =
{
1, if f((x1, . . . , xd), (y1, . . . , yd)) ∈ D,
0, otherwise,
and the acceptance set as
Acc[t1, . . . , tn] =
{
1, if (t1, . . . , tn) 6= (0, . . . , 0),
0, otherwise.
All iterations will reply the same answer for the function F and a
random answer for F ∗. Let p (resp. p∗) be the probability that the distin-
guisher outputs 1 when it is fed with F (resp. F ∗). Hence, according to
the acceptance set defined above, we get p = 1µ and p
∗ = 1− (1− 1µ)n. If
we consider n = 2, two iterations only, then the advantage of the distin-
guisher will be |p−p∗| = | 1µ − (1− (1− 1µ)2)| = 1µ(1− 1µ) which is high. By
this way, we can distinguish the cipher C from the ideal random cipher
C∗ by distinguishing the function F defining the right part of the output
of the cipher C from the ideal random function F ∗.
3.2 Assuming a Low δ is NECESSARY
Theorem 1 shows that if a cipher is decorrelated to the order 2d, then it re-
sists to an iterated attack of order d. Moreover, it is speculated that a high
probability δ of having a common query does not provide any advantage
to the adversary. However, we give a counterintuitive example showing
that there is an iterated distinguisher of order 1 on a 2d-decorrelated ci-
pher when the probability of having at least one query in common in any
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two iterations is high. This shows that Theorem 1 is not universal and
has a limit since δ may increase the bound of the distinguisher.
In our distinguisher, we use C depicted in Fig. 2 for κ = 2d and q = 2k.
Note that Theorem 7 implies that ‖[C]2d − [C∗]2d‖A ≤ 8d2/2k. We are
going to prove that the random cipher C defined above is not resisting
the iterated attack of order 1 when the set of plaintexts of adversary’s
choice is small. Let S be a set of plaintexts S = {x1, x2, . . . , x2d+2}, where
xi = x
L
i ‖xRi , xL and xR are left and right halves of xi, respectively. These
sets of plaintexts satisfy xRi = 0 and
∑2d+2
i=1 (x
L
i )
j
= 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2d − 1
and all xLi ’s are pairwise distinct elements of GF(2
k). The algorithm to
generate the left part of the plaintexts in S is provided in Fig. 4.
This algorithm finds p(x) = x2d+2 + ax2 + bx + c with distinct roots
in GF(2k), where a, b, c ∈ GF(2k). Note that p(x) has roots of the form∑2d+2
i=1 (x
L
i )
j
= 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2d − 1. This is proved in Appendix B for the
case n = 2d+ 2. The expected number of iterations in the algorithm can
be computed heuristically as 2k(2d+2)/
(
2k
2d+2
) ≤ (2d+2)!, that is, one over
the probability that a random monic polynomial of degree 2d+2 has 2d+2
distinct roots in GF(2k). Since there are 2k possible irreducible factors of
degree 1 in GF(2k)[x], we compute their 2d + 2 possible combinations(
2k
2d+2
)
to construct polynomials of degree 2d+ 2 and we divide it by the
total number of monic polynomials of degree 2d+ 2 which is 2k(2d+2). In
each iteration, we pick one element of S at random. Since the adversary’s
choice of input set has 2d+ 2 elements, we have δ = 1/(2d+ 2).
Input: k, d
Output: (x1, . . . , x2d+2)
repeat
pick a, b, c ∈ GF(2k) at random and construct p(x) = x2d+2 + ax2 + bx+ c
until x2
k ≡ x mod p(x) and gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1
find the roots (x1, . . . , x2d+2) of p(x) by using a factorization algorithm for poly-
nomials
return (x1, . . . , x2d+2)
Fig. 4. The algorithm to generate the left half of the plaintexts in S
Like in the first counterexample, in order to distinguish this cipher
C from the ideal random cipher C∗, we are going to take advantage of
the right half of the output of the cipher. For this, at first we will show
how to define the right part of the cipher to be a random function. When
plaintexts xi’s are satisfying the above properties, we have yi = y
L
i ‖yRi =
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(F3(F2(x
L
i +F1(0))) +x
L
i +F1(0))‖F2(xLi +F1(0)). We only use the right
part of the ciphertext which can be seen as an output of a random polyno-
mial of degree at most 2d−1. In detail, since yRi = F2(xLi +F1(0)), yRi can
be written as a function of xLi such that F (x
L
i ) = F2(x
L
i +a
1
0). Obviously,
each coefficient of the polynomial function F is a function of the coeffi-
cients of F2 and the constant coefficient of F1, namely f(a
1
0, a
2
2d−1, . . . , a
2
0).
The fact that the coefficients of F are depending on the coefficients of ran-
dom functions implies that F is also a random function. We then denote
the function F as F (x) = a2d−1x2d−1 + a2d−2x2d−2 + · · ·+ a0 over GF(q).
The trick is that we distinguish the right half of the output of C
which is in fact the polynomial F mentioned above. To explain how the
distinguisher works briefly, when we consider that the plaintext space has
the special form mentioned before, the right half of the cipher C which
defines a polynomial F can be distinguished by using the trace. This is
because, by the following Lemma, the sum of the trace of all elements in
the set S behaves differently in this polynomial function F than in the
ideal random function F ∗ allowing us to distinguish C from C∗. Now, we
will propose this distinguishing property of the polynomial function F .
Lemma 11. Let F be a random function and S be the input set defined as
above. For xi = x
L
i ‖0 ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d+ 2, we have
∑2d+2
i=1 Tr(F (x
L
i )) = 0.
Proof. Since
∑2d+2
i=1 (x
L
i )
j = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2d− 1, we have
2d+2∑
i=1
Tr(F (xLi )) =
2d+2∑
i=1
Tr(a2d−1(xLi )
2d−1
+ a2d−2(xLi )
2d−2
+ · · ·+ a0) =
Tr
(
a2d−1
2d+2∑
i=1
(xLi )
2d−1)
+ Tr
(
a2d−2
2d+2∑
i=1
(xLi )
2d−2)
+ · · ·+ Tr
(
a0
2d+2∑
i=1
(xLi )
0
)
.
Which is equal to 0 due the linearity of trace, the characteristic of this
field being 2, and Tr(0) = 0. uunionsq
We emphasize that Lemma 11 implies that there is an even number of
F (xLi )’s which have Tr(F (x
L
i )) = 1 since
∑2d+2
i=1 Tr(F (x
L
i )) = 0. We use
this property of F to distinguish the cipher C from the ideal random
cipher C∗. In fact, like in the first counterexample, we distinguish the
function F which is equivalent to distinguishing C.
Now, we explicitly explain how the iterated distinguisher of order 1
with n iterations works, where the input is distributed independently
and identically over the set S. We us the property of the polynomial
function F which is stated in Lemma 11 in a way that in each iteration,
13
we pick a plaintext x from S at random and compute the trace of F (xL),
i.e., t = Tr(F (xL)) since F (xL) = yR. Then, we compute the average
T¯ = 1n(t1 + · · · + tn), where ti is the output of iteration i. We decide
whether the oracle implements F (equivalently C) or F ∗ (equivalently
C∗) by simply checking that the average value T¯ is in the specified set K
which is determined according to the expected values of both T¯ and T¯ ∗.
Lemma 12. Assume that the plaintext set S has the above property.
Then, depending on S, the expected value of T¯ takes any value from the
set S1 = {2m/(2d+ 2)| 0 ≤ m ≤ d+ 1} , and the expected value of T¯ ∗
takes any value from the set S2 = {m/(2d+ 2)|0 ≤ m ≤ 2d+ 2} .
Proof. Assume that there are 2m number of xi’s in S such that F (x
L
i )’s
have Tr(F (xLi )) = 1 (from Lemma 11). Then, the number of xi’s satisfying
Tr(F (xLi )) = 1 in n iterations is expected to be n(2m)/(2d + 2), where
0 ≤ m ≤ d + 1. Therefore, the expected value of T¯ will be 2m/(2d + 2),
where 0 ≤ m ≤ d+ 1. In a similar way, we can find the expected value of
E(T¯ ∗) for the ideal random function F ∗. uunionsq
Now, using Lemma 12, we define the acceptance set as
Acc[t1, . . . , tn] =
{
1, if T¯ ∈ K = ⋃d+1m=0 ( 2m2d+2 − ε, 2m2d+2 + ε),
0, otherwise.
Typically, ε = 1/(4d + 4). Let p (resp. p∗) be the probability that the
distinguisher outputs 1 when it is fed with F (resp. F ∗). The following
lemma states the bounds for both p and p∗.
Lemma 13. We have p ≥ 1− 2e−2nε2 and p∗ ≤ 12 + e−2nε
2
.
Proof. For the function F , according to the acceptance set defined previ-
ously, p is expressed by p =
∑
x∈S1 Pr[E(T¯ ) = x] Pr[T¯ ∈ K|E(T¯ ) = x].
Since Pr[T¯ ∈ K|E(T¯ ) = x] ≥ 1 − 2e−2nε2 by Hoeffding’s bound from
Lemma 9, we have p ≥ 1 − 2e−2nε2 . Similarly, p∗ is computed as p∗ =∑
x∈S2 Pr[E(T¯
∗) = x] Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) = x]. The computation of p∗ is
not straightforward, hence, we first compute the probability that each
expected value of T¯ ∗ from S2 occurs with probability Pr[E(T¯ ∗) = x] =(
2d+2
x(2d+2)
)
2−(2d+2). In detail, we are picking x(2d+ 2) places for 1’s among
2d + 2 possible places and dividing the total number of possible choices
which is 22d+2. Furthermore, the probabilities Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) = x] are
different according to the expected value of different T¯ ∗. More explicitly,
when E(T¯ ∗) = 2m/(2d+2) for 0 ≤ m ≤ d+1, we have Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) =
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x] ≤ 1. Similarly, when E(T¯ ∗) = (2m′ + 1)/(2d + 2), 0 ≤ m′ ≤ d, we get
Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) = x] ≤ 2e−2nε2 by Hoeffding’s bound (Lemma 9). Then,
p∗ can be computed as
p∗ =
∑
x∈{2m/(2d+2)|0≤m≤d+1}
Pr[E(T¯ ∗) = x] Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) = x]
+
∑
x∈{(2m′+1)/(2d+2)|0≤m′≤d}
Pr[E(T¯ ∗) = x] Pr[T¯ ∗ ∈ K|E(T¯ ∗) = x]
≤
∑
x∈{2m/(2d+2)|0≤m≤d+1}
(
2d+ 2
x(2d+ 2)
)
2−(2d+2)
+
∑
x∈{(2m′+1)/(2d+2)|0≤m′≤d}
(
2d+ 2
x(2d+ 2)
)
2−(2d+2)2e−2nε
2
.
Note that the sum of even and odd indices of binomial coefficients are∑
i≥0
(
n
2i
)
= 2n−1 and
∑
i≥0
(
n
2i+1
)
= 2n−1, respectively. Hence, we have∑
x∈{2m/(2d+2)|0≤m≤d+1}
(
2d+ 2
x(2d+ 2)
)
2−(2d+2) =
1
2
.
Then, we get∑
x∈{(2m′+1)/(2d+2)|0≤m′≤d}
(
2d+ 2
x(2d+ 2)
)
2−(2d+2)2e−2nε
2 ≤ 1
2
2e−2nε
2
= e−2nε
2
.
Therefore, we get p∗ ≤ 12 + e−2nε
2
. uunionsq
Finally, the advantage of the distinguisher is computed as
|p− p∗| ≥
∣∣∣(1− 2e−2nε2)− (1
2
+ e−2nε
2
)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣1
2
− 3e−2nε2
∣∣∣.
When the distinguisher has a large number of iterations, we have |p −
p∗| ≈ 1/2 which is quite high. This way we manage to distinguish the
cipher C from the ideal random cipher C∗. Hence, in specific situations,
having common queries can increase the advantage. Essentially, if the
images of 2d + 2 points sum to zero, by taking ε = 1/(4d + 4) and n ≈
Ω(d2) we obtain an efficient iterated distinguisher of order 1. This could
be used to transform Integral/Square/Saturation attacks to this kind of
distinguisher (with a squared number of inputs).
As a final remark, in Decorrelation Theory, Vaudenay considers block
ciphers in the context of deterministic symmetric key encryption. There-
fore, for some input distribution, the probability δ that two iterations
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have at least one query in common can be high. However, if we consider
symmetric-key probabilistic encryption, then δ will always be small. This
is because, in this scheme, the oracle picks the random coins, and even if
the same plaintext is picked by the adversary, the random coins picked by
the oracle for two plaintexts would be different which causes two different
inputs to the encryption. This implies that high δ is not a threat when
we consider the probabilistic encryption.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
We settled an open problem and disproved a claim, both of which are
raised by the EUROCRYPT ’99 work of Vaudenay in Decorrelation The-
ory. In particular, we proved that in order for a cipher C to resist a
non-adaptive iterated attack of order d, it is not sufficient to have a decor-
relation of order 2d−1. We showed this by providing a cipher decorrelated
to the order 2d−1 and a successful non-adaptive iterated attack against it
which has order d. Hence, we concluded that the minimal order of decor-
relation to ensure resistance is 2d. Furthermore, we illustrated that when
the probability of having a common query between different iterations
increases, the advantage of the distinguisher can increase.
Our counterexamples comprise of non-adaptive distinguishers. One
could also investigate whether or not a similar result holds for the case of
adaptive adversaries. Moreover, the adversaries we consider make plain-
text queries and receive the corresponding ciphertexts. A different ad-
versarial model can also be considered where the adversary can make
ciphertext queries together with plaintext queries.
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A The Proof of Theorem 6
This proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 1 [Vau03] except
for the computation of V (T (F ∗)) which results in a tighter bound for the
distinguisher. Given F = f (resp. F ∗ = f), let T (f) be the probability
that test function T outputs 1 when (X, f(X)) is its input, i.e., T (f) =
EX(T (X, f(X))). Let p (resp. p∗) be the probability that the distinguisher
outputs 1, i.e., p = PrF [(T1(F ), . . . , Tn(F )) ∈ Acc], where Acc is the
acceptance set and Ti(F ) (resp. Ti(F
∗)) is the output of iteration i.
Since Ti(F )’s are all independent with the same expected value T (F )
which only depends on F , we get
p = EF
( ∑
(t1,...,tn)∈Acc
T (F )t1+···+tn(1− T (F ))n−(t1+···+tn)
)
.
Then, p can be rewritten as p =
∑n
i=0 aiEF (T (F )i(1 − T (F ))n−i)
for some integers ai such that 0 ≤ ai ≤
(
n
i
)
. Therefore, the advantage
|p − p∗| is maximal when all ai’s are either 0 or
(
n
i
)
depending on the
distributions T (F ) and T (F ∗). This implies that the acceptance set of
the best distinguisher is of the form Acc = {(t1, . . . , tn)|
∑n
i=1 ti ∈ B} for
some set B ⊆ {0, . . . , n}. Therefore, we have p = EF (s(T (F ))) where
s(x) =
∑
x∈B
(
n
i
)
xi(1− x)n−i.
Recall that |s(T (F ))−s(T (F ∗))| ≤ 2n|T (F )−T (F ∗)|. In addition, we
have |EF (T (F ))−EF ∗(T (F ∗))| ≤ ε/2, |EF (T 2(F ))−EF ∗(T 2(F ∗))| ≤ ε/2
and |V (T (F )) − V (T (F ∗))| ≤ 3ε/2. Then, the advantage of the dis-
tinguisher is |p − p∗| = |E(T (F )) − E(T (F ∗))| ≤ E(|T (F ) − T (F ∗)|).
By applying Tchebichev’s inequality for both T (F ) and T (F ∗) which is
Pr[|T (F )−E(T (F ))| > λ] ≤ V (T (F ))/λ2 for any λ > 0 (same for T (F ∗)),
we get
|p− p∗| ≤ 5
(
(2V (T (F ∗)) +
3ε
2
)
n2
) 1
3
+ nε, (2)
when λ =
(
2V (T (F ∗))+ 3
2
n
) 1
3
. Up to this point, the proof was the same
with the proof of Theorem 1. However, the bound for V (T (F ∗)) is dif-
ferent from the bound for V (T (C∗)), where C∗ is the ideal random ci-
pher. We get V (T (F ∗)) to be equal to
∑
(x,y),(x′,y′)∈T Pr[X = x] Pr[X =
x′]
(
PrF ∗ [(x, x
′) F
∗−−→ (y, y′)]− PrF ∗ [x F
∗−−→ y] PrF ∗ [x′ F
∗−−→ y′]
)
.
In order to bound this sum, we divide pairs (x, x′) into two groups of
pairs such that the first group has no common queries, i.e., ∀i, j xi 6= x′j ,
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but the second one has. As a remark, we assume that the adversary does
not pick the same query in a single iteration, i.e., xi 6= xj , when i 6= j.
Since all xi are distinct in x = (x1, . . . , xd), then [F
∗]d(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd) =∏d
i=1 Pr[F
∗(xi) = yi] = N−d. When inputs x and x′ have no com-
mon queries, then [F ∗]2d(x1,...,xd,x′1,...,x′d),(y1,...,yd,y′1,...,y′d) =
∏d
i=1 Pr[F
∗(xi) =
yi]
∏d
i=1 Pr[F
∗(x′i)= y
′
i]= N
−2d. Therefore, when input tuples x and x′
have no common queries, the sum will be 0. Otherwise, when the plain-
text tuples x and x′ have common queries with probability δ, then the
sum over all these plaintext tuples will be less than δ. Hence, we have
V (T (F ∗)) ≤ δ. When we substitute δ for V (T (F ∗)) in Inequality 2, we
get |p− p∗| ≤ 5 3
√(
2δ + 3ε2
)
n2 + nε.
B A Required Lemma for Subsection 3.2
Lemma 14. Let f be a polynomial of the form f(x) = xn + a1x
n−1 +
a2x
n−1 + · · ·+ an−2x2 + an−1x+ an over GF(2k) and x1, x2, . . . , xn be its
roots. If a1 = a2 = · · · = an−3 = 0, then its roots satisfy sk =
∑n
i=1 x
j
i =
0, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 3 and n ≥ 4.
Proof. First, we recall the Newton formulas. Let f be a polynomial of
the form f(x) = xn + a1x
n−1 + a2xn−1 + · · · + an−2x2 + an−1x + an
with the roots x1, x2, . . . , xn so that f(x) = (x− x1)(x− x2) · · · (x− xn)
over a ring R. Then, we define the elementary symmetric functions of the
roots as
∑
1≤i≤n xi = −a1,
∑
1≤i<j≤n xixj = a2,
∑
1≤i<j<k≤n xixjxk =
−a3, . . . , and x1x2 · · ·xn = (−1)nan.
In addition, kth power sums of the roots is defined as sk =
∑
1≤i≤n x
k
i .
Then, Newton formulas give recursion relations between ai’s and si’s as
s1 + a1 = 0, s2 + a1s1 + 2a2 = 0, . . . , sn + a1sn−1 + a2sn−2 + · · ·+ nan =
0, sn+1 + a1sn−1 + a2sn−2 + · · ·+ s1an = 0.
Note that Newton formulas are valid over finite fields. Now, if we
assume that a1 = a2 = · · · = an−3 = 0, then according to the Newton
formulas given above we will show that sk = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 3. Since
s1 + a1 = 0 and a1 = 0, we have s1 = 0. By induction, assume that
s1 = s2 = · · · = sk−1 = 0 and a1 = a2 = · · · = ak = 0, then we have
sk = −(a1sk−1 + a2sk−2 + · · · + kak) = 0. Therefore, the polynomial
f(x) = xn + an−2x2 + an−1x + an satisfies sk =
∑n
i=1 x
j
i = 0, where
1 ≤ j ≤ n− 3 and n ≥ 4. uunionsq
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